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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEREMIAH MAUL, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 990195-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to arrest judgment by denying Maul's 
motion for a new trial based on juror bias? A trial court's denial of a motion for new 
trial is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 
220, 222 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved in a post-trial motion and at a hearing 
(R. 168-79, 244). 
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CONTROT JJNG STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of Rules 23 and 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is set forth 
in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jeremiah Maul appeals from the judgment and sentence by the Honorable K.L. 
Mclff in Sixth District Court after a jury trial at which Maul was convicted of 
aggravated burglary and kidnapping, first degree felonies, and theft of a firearm, a 
second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Maul was charged by information filed in the Sixth District Court on or about 
January 9, 1998, with the following two charges: Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated 
Kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-203, 
76-5-302; and Theft of a Firearm, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-412 (R. 1-2). 
On January 21, 1998, a preliminary hearing was conducted before the Honorable 
David Mower, after which Maul was bound-over on all three charges for arraignment 
(R. 241). 
On February 18, 1998, Maul filed with the trial court a Notice of Alibi (R. 40). 
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On April 10, 1998, Maul filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (R. 44-61). After 
a hearing, Judge K.L. Mclff denied Maul's motion on June 29, 1998 (R. 116-24. 242). 
On August 27-28, 1998, a jury trial was conducted before Judge Mclff, at the 
close of which Maul was found guilty of all counts in the aforementioned information 
(R. 245, 246, 159-61). 
On September 14, 1998, Maul filed with the trial court a Motion for a New Trial 
along with supporting affidavits which claimed that Juror Christine Christensen failed 
to disclose a relationship to several of the trial witnesses (R. 168-79). On November 4, 
1998, a hearing was held on Maul's motion (R. 244). A copy of affidavits from Juror 
Christine Christensen and from defense witnesses Marie and Angela Goode, which 
were filed with the trial court in relation to the motion are attached in the Addenda. 
At the hearing on Maul's motion, Juror Christine Christensen testified that she 
has been a resident of Fountain Green for eight years (R. 244 at 7). Christensen 
testified that one of her neighbors is Craig Nielson (R. 244 at 8). Christensen testified 
that at court she became aware that Craig Nielson is Clay Nielson's father (R. 244 at 
8). Both Craig and Clay testified against Maul during trial. 
Christensen also testified that in 1993 she was employed at the Super 8 Motel 
with Mary Goode, a defense witness and the mother of another defense witness, Angie 
Goode (R. 244 at 9). Christensen testified that she worked at the motel for two months 
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and that while she worked their she was acquainted with Mary Goode-but that it was 
not a close relationship (R. 244 at 10-11). 
Christensen testified further that she also has known Angela Goode for many 
years (R. 244 at 13). Christensen testified that she remembered being present at one 
social activity with Angela Goode but that she was not aware of any rumors concerning 
a relationship between Angela and her husband (R. 244 at 13). 
Christensen's affidavit indicates that she was only "acquainted" with Angela and 
Mary/ie Goode along with Deputy Gary Larsen, a trial witness, and Cal Nielson, the 
brother of witness Clay Nielson (R. 180-82). 
Angela Goode, who has been a resident of Fountain Green along with her 
mother, testified that she knew Christine Christensen and her husband (R. 244 at 20). 
Angela testified that she has been to the Christensen's house on three-four occasions 
and has hung out with the same crowd as Christensen's husband (R. 244 at 20-22). 
Angela classified her relationship with Christensen as a casual relationship (R. 244 at 
23). Angela also testified that she, at some point, had heard of accusations being made 
concerning her relationship with Christensen's husband (R. 244 at 24). Angela testified 
that she was informed of these accusations by the wife of Christen's best friend (R. 244 
at 25-27). 
Mary Goode submitted an affidavit to the trial court in which she testified as 
follows: For the past six years she has been employed at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi, 
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Utah (R. 169). In 1996 or 1997, Christene Chris tensen was employed at the motel as a 
maid; and that "her work under my supervision was unsatisfactory" which resulted in 
Christensen's termination (R. 169). Mary believe that this termination resulted in 
feelings of animosity towards her by Christensen and that this animosity would have 
tainted her impartiality as a juror (R. 170). 
Maul's motion was subsequently denied by Judge Mclff with written findings 
entered on December 16, 1998 (R. 196-202). The trial court found: One, that during 
jury selection, "Christine Christensen did not advise the court about any acquaintance 
she had" with Clay Nielson or Mary and Angela Goode (R. 197). Two, that the court 
had instructed all potential jurors to disclose any relationship with witnesses that was 
more than a casual acquaintanceship (Id.). Three, that "Christine Christensen's 
relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and 
Craig Nielson are all of a casual nature" (R. 199). Four, that "Mary Goode and 
Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she was a potential 
juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury" (R. 199). Accordingly, the trial 
court concluded that no actual or implied bias by Christensen against Maul had been 
shown; and that no basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against 
Christensen (R. 199-200). 
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On January 6, 1999, Maul was sentenced to concurrent terms in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 203-08, 243). On March 4, 1999, after a thirty-day extension, Maul filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Sixth District Court, and this action followed (R. 233-39). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Ginger Mellor testified that in January of 1998 she was house-sitting for her 
sister and brother-in-law, Brenda and Craig Nielson, in Centerfield, Utah, for 
approximately five-seven days (R. 245 at 94-95). The house was also occupied by 
Craig Nielson's twenty-three year old son, Clay Nielson, and by Brenda Nielsen's 
fourteen-year old son, Kent Ashworth (R. 245 at 95). While Mellor was house-sitting, 
the three Nielson's were gone and she was at the home with Ashworth and her thirteen-
year old daughter, Christine (R. 245 at 96). 
Mellor testified that on the night of January 6, 1998, she went to bed upstairs in 
the master bedroom, while the kids slept on the ground floor in Ashworth's room (R. 
245 at 97). After 1:00 a.m., Mellor was awakened by the Nielson's dog barking (R. 
245 at 99). Mellor said she sat up in bed to find a flashlight in her face (Id.). The 
male individual behind the flashlight told Mellor to sit still and then asked her who 
lived in the house and asked where "Clay" was (R. 245 at 101). Mellor testified that 
she advised the individual that Clay was out-of-town with the Nielson's (R. 245 at 
102). Mellor did not recognize the individual's voice (R. 245 at 103). Mellor testified 
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that it was 2:01 a.m. when this conversation occurred (R. 245 at 103-04). Mellor then, 
upon request, told the individual her name and that there were two kids downstairs (R. 
245 at 104). Mellor subsequendy heard another male voice (R. 245 at 106). 
Mellor testified that the individual with the flashlight informed her that "they had 
been tipped off that there was a lot of money that was in the house" and asked her 
where it was located (R. 245 at 107). Mellor informed him that she was house-sitting 
and had no knowledge of any money except that in her wallet (Id.). Mellor said she 
was then told not to mess with the individual and threatened with her safety (R. 245 at 
108). 
The individual then took Mellor downstairs where they checked to make sure the 
kids were asleep before going to Clay's room (R. 245 at 109-112). Mellor was told to 
lay down on Clay's bed on her stomach and she was tied up with an extension cord (R. 
245 at 112-15). Mellor testified that the individuals then ransacked Clay's room before 
the male individual who had been talking to her came back and showed her a loaded 
gun (R. 245 at 117-18). Mellor testified that she then heard noise upstairs for 
approximately fifteen-twenty minutes (R. 245 at 119). Finally, the individual who had 
spoken repeatedly with Mellor came back downstairs. He apologized but told her not 
to call the police or they would be back (R. 245 at 120). 
Mellor testified that the individuals left at approximatley 2:45 a.m. and that she 
called out to the kids who came and untied her (R. 245 at 120-21, 130). Mellor then 
7 
called Brenda Nielson on her cellular phone and told her what had happened (R. 245 at 
122). Nielson told her to get the handgun out of the gun cabinet for protection and to 
take the kids to Sterling to Mellor's parents house (R. 245 at 123). However, Mellor 
testified that the gun was missing (R. 245 at 125). Then she and the kids went to 
Sterling (R. 245 at 126). 
Once they arrived in Sterling, Mellor testified that her mother called the police 
(Id.). At approximately 8:00 a.m. Mellor and her father went to the Sanpete County 
Sheriffs Office (R. 245 at 127). Officer Blake Edwards informed Mellor that they had 
a suspect in custody and that he wanted to do a voice identification over a speaker 
phone (R. 245 at 128). Mellor testified that after hearing the suspect speak, she 
informed Edwards that he was the individual who had been in the house earlier that 
morning (R. 245 at 131). 
Blake Edwards, a deputy with the Sanpete County Sheriffs office, testified that 
at approximately 3:45 a.m. on January 7, 1998, he was notified through dispatch of an 
incident that had happened in Centerfield at 150 West Hansen Lane (R. 245 at 168-70). 
Edwards then called the complainant, Ginger Mellor, in Sterling (R. 245 at 170-71). 
Mellor informed Edwards of a burglary at her sister's house (R. 245 at 171). After 
checking the Nielson home, Edwards went to Sterling and spoke with Mellor at her 
parents house (R. 245 at 172). 
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Edwards then called the Nielsons' on their cellular phone and spoke with Clay 
Nielson (R. 245 at 173). Edwards explained the situation to Clay and testified that 
Clay informed him that "It's that Goddamned Jeremy" (R. 245 at 174). Edwards was 
informed by Clay that he was involved in a custody battle with a girl named Angie and 
that she was living in American Fork with a person named "Jeremy" (R. 245 at 175). 
Edwards was told to call Angie's mother Mary in Fountain Green for more information 
(R. 245 at 176). 
Edwards contacted Mary Goode by telephone who confirmed that she was 
Angie's mother (R. 245 at 177). Edwards testified that he was informed that Angie and 
Jeremy were at her mother's house at "midnight" and she gave him Angie and Jeremy 
Maul's address in American Fork (R. 245 at 177-78). Edwards then contacted the 
American Fork Police Department for assistance (R. 245 at 179). 
According to Edwards, the American Fork police drove to the address and took 
Maul into custody at approximately 7:15 a.m. (R. 245 at 181-82; R. 246 at 62). 
Edwards then arranged for a telephonic voice identification with Maul in American 
Fork and Mellor in Sanpete County (R. 245 at 182). Edwards read Maul his rights and 
then asked him some questions addressing him by name (R. 245 at 185). Edwards 
testified that Mellor identified Maul's voice as the voice who had been in the Nielson's 
house within thirty seconds of Maul's waiver of his miranda rights (R. 245 at 187). 
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Edwards drove to American Fork and interviewed Maul at the police department 
at approximately 6:00 p.m. (R. 245 at 189). Edwards again mirandized Maul (Id.). 
After a long conversation about the Centerfied incident, Edwards testified that Maul 
confessed and indicated that he had been after Clay and intended to kill him (R. 245 at 
191, 193). Edwards testified that Maul also admitted to taking a gun and money from 
the house (R. 245 at 194-95). Edwards testifed that Maul told him that they had 
stopped in Fairview for food and gasoline on the way home from the Nielson residence 
(R. 245 at 216). However, Edwards testified that there was no food or gas 
establishment open in Fairview between the hours of 2:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (R. 245 
at 217). 
Edwards also testified that it took him an hour and forty-seven minutes to drive 
from the Nielson's house in Centerfield to Maul's house in American Fork; and that the 
distance was approximately 108.3 miles (R. 245 at 199, 201). 
Gary Larsen, a Deputy Sheriff for Sanpete County, testified that he was at the 
American Fork Police Department at approximately 6:00 p.m. on January 7, 1998, 
assisting Edwards with an interrogation of Maul (R. 246 at 7). Larsen testified that 
Edwards advised Maul of his Miranda rights before the questioning began (R. 246 at 8-
10). 
Larsen testified that during the interview he told Maul that he knew Angie 
Goode and the father of her other child, Jeremy Ivory (R. 246 at 10). Larsen also 
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testified that during the questioning, Maul confessed to entering into the Nielson 
residence in Centerfield earlier that morning with the "intent to kill Clay before Clay 
killed him" (R. 246 at 11). Larsen testified that Maul told him that "Clay had paid 
someone to kill him" (Id.). Larsen also testified that Maul confessed to taking money 
and a revolver from the Nielson residence and that he had tied Mellor on the bed with 
an electrical cord (R. 246 at 13, 14-15). Larsen also indicated that Maul informed him 
that he had stopped in Fairview on the way home from Centerfield (R. 246 at 17). 
Clay Nielson testified that in January of 1998 he was living in Centerfied with 
his father, Craig, and his step-mother, Brenda, and her son; and that on January 6-7, 
1998, he was in New Mexico with Craig and Brenda (R. 246 at 27-28). Clay testified 
that he and Angie Goode have a son together at that there were conflicts over custody 
and visitation (R. 246 at 28-). Clay testified that he and Jeremy Maul had argued over 
visitation and that threats had been made (R. 246 at 33-34). 
Brenda Nielson testified that on the morning of January 7, 1998, she received a 
phone call at approximately 2:30 a.m. from her sister Ginger Mellor, who was 
housesitting for the Nielson's in Centerfied (R. 246 at 49, 51-52). Brenda testified that 
Mellor told her that two men and entered the home looking for Clay and that threats 
had been made (R. 246 at 49). Brenda testified that she told Mellor to leave the house 
(R. 246 at 50). Brenda also testified that all clocks in the Nielson home are set fifteen 
minutes fast (R. 246 at 52-53). 
11 
Brenda testified that when she advised Clay of what had happened, he thought 
that it might have been Maul who had entered the house (R. 246 at 58). Brenda 
testified that before 8:00 a.m. she spoke with Mellor again and told her that it could 
have been Maul who entered the house (R. 246 at 59). 
Mary Goode, Angie Goode's mother, testified that she lives in Fountain Green, 
Utah (R. 246 at 67). Mary testified that on January 6, 1998, Angie came to her house 
at approximately 11:30 p.m. to pick-up some videos and money and left at 
approximately midnight (R. 246 at 70). At 3:30 a.m. on January 7, 1998, Mary 
received a call from Deputy Edwards about money and guns involving Angie (R. 246 at 
68-69). Mary then called her mother, at approximately 4:00 a.m., and had her place a 
call to Angie to make sure she was O.K. (R. 246 at 72). 
Angela Goode testified that in January of 1998 she was living in American Fork 
with Jeremy Maul, his mother and brothers, and her two sons (R. 246 at 88-89). 
Angie testified that on the evening of January 6, 1998, she did drive to her mother's 
house in Fountain Green leaving Maul at home in American Fork watching her two 
children (R. 246 at 95). Angie testified that she returned home at approximately 1:15 
a.m. (R. 246 at 97). She locked the house door, returned the car keys to Maul's 
mother (on her dresser) and went downstairs where she and Maul slept (R. 246 at 97, 
158). Angie testified that she found Maul asleep on their bed at this point (R. 246 at 
97). 
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Angie testified that she was awaken by Maul's mother to take a phone call from 
her frantic grandmother and assured her that everyone was fine (R. 246 at 98-99). 
Angie testified that she believed the phone call from her grandmother was made about 
4:00 a.m. (R. 246 at 100). Angie and Maul went back to sleep, and Angie testified 
that she was next awakened by Maul indicating that there were cops outside who 
wanted to speak with them (R. 246 at 100). 
Janene Maul, Jeremy Maul's mother, testified that in January of 1998 she was 
residing in American Fork and that Maul and Angie and her two sons were residing 
with her (R. 246 at 129). Janene testified that she is a "pretty light sleeper" and that 
the stairs going down to Maul and Angie's rooms pass within three feet of her bedroom 
door; and that she typically hears when someone comes into the house and she is in her 
bedroom (R. 246 at 130-31). 
Janene testified that Angie came in to her bedroom at approximately 10:15 p.m. 
on January 6, 1998, and asked to borrow her car (R. 246 at 134). Janene agreed if 
Maul watched the two children because Janene had to be up early the next morning 
(Id.). Janene testified that sometime after 1:00 a.m. Angie came in to her bedroom, 
"dropped the keys off on the dresser and sa[id] 'I'm home'" (R. 246 at 136). Janene 
testified that she was next awakened at 4:30 a.m. by her alarm clock (Id.). Janene 
testified that other than Angie, she saw or heard no one leave or enter the house 
between midnight and 4:30 a.m. (R. 246 at 137). 
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At approximately 4:50 Janene received a phone call from Angie's grandmother 
and went downstairs where she found Maul and Angie asleep in their bed (R. 246 at 
140). Janene testified that on her way to work at approximatley 5:10 a.m. she was 
stopped by the police, ordered out of her car, took her to the police station and detained 
her until 7:30 a.m. (R. 246 at 141-43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants 
the right to a fair and impartial jury. Maul asserts that in this case, he was denied that 
constitutional protection. One of the juror's failure to disclose a relationship between 
herself and the key defense witnesses led to the inclusion of a biased individual on the 
jury panel. Her failure to disclose this connection prevented any investigation of the 
relationship on voir dire and more importantly it prevented Maul from exercising an 
informed peremptory challenge. When this hostile relationship between juror and 
witnesses became known, Maul filed a motion for a new trial with the trial court which 
was denied. Maul asserts that this denial constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ARREST JUDGMENT AND GRANT MAUL A NEW TRIAL 
ON GROUNDS OF JUROR BIAS 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants the 
right to a trial by an impartial jury. See, State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
1977). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the "right to a trial by a 
fair and impartial jury is an important one which should be scrupulously safeguarded." 
State v. Durand. 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977). Maul asserts that he was denied 
his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror Christine Christensen's failure to advise 
the trial court of her relationship with several key witnesses during jury selection and 
voir dire. 
Upon learning of these relationships after trial, Maul filed with the trial court a 
motion to arrest judgment in the form of a motion for new trial on grounds of juror 
bias. Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court can 
arrest judgment prior to sentence for any "good cause." Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure similarly grants to the trial court the ability to grant a new trial "in 
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse affect upon the rights of a party." Maul asserts that Christensen's failure to 
disclose her familiarity (and accompanying bias) with several key witnesses was 
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improper and substantially and adversely affected Maul's right to trial by an impartial 
jury. In addition, the trial court's failure to grant Maul a new trial once this failure was 
shown constituted an abuse of discretion. See, Williams, 712 P.2d at 222. 
The jury selection process is designed to insure the empaneling of a fair and 
impartial jury. Indeed "voir dire serves two functions: 'the detection of actual bias 
[sufficient to challenge for cause], and the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of the peremptory challenge.'" State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 
1994) (quoting State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)). Maul asserts that 
Christensen's failure to disclose even the casual nature of her relationship with the 
Nielson's and more particularly with Mary and Angela Goode goes to the very heart of 
the purpose for jury voir dire. One, it prevented the detection of actual bias in her 
feelings about Mary and Angela Goode. Two, more importantly it stripped Maul and 
his counsel of the ability to engage in an informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge. 
In State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), a potential juror during voir dire 
disclosed that he was a neighbor of one of the prosecution's key witnesses. This 
disclosure led to a lengthy exchange between the juror, the trial court and counsel 
which highlighted the extent and depth of the relationship. 563 P.2d at 800-01. At the 
close of the exchange, defense counsel challenged the juror for cause which was denied 
by the trial court on the grounds that the juror and witness were "acquaintances." 
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Brooks. 563 P.2d at 801. However, the Utah Supreme Court reversed because the 
record, as developed in the exchange between juror, counsel and the trial court, 
indicated that a real friendship existed between the prospective juror and witness. IcL 
Maul asserts that the relationship between juror Christensen and Mary and 
Angela Goode goes beyond the casual nature found by the trial court after trial. Mary 
and Angela Goode's testimony was critical to Maul's alibi defense at trial. Moreover, 
Christensen's failure to disclose any relationship between her and the defense witnesses 
prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of any 
actual bias on the part of Christensen as it related to her feelings towards Mary and 
Angela Goode. In addition, the failure to disclose any relationship prevented Maul 
from collecting the data which would have permitted the informed exercise of a 
peremptory challenge to dismiss Christensen from the jury panel. 
In State v. Suarez. 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990), this Court adopted the two-
prong test of the United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment v. 
Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850 (1984), to determine whether a 
juror should be excused for cause for answering falsely on voir dire. In Suarez, a 
prospective juror on voir dire answered a question concerning the veracity of police 
officers in a manner which was inconsistent with his response to a similar question by a 
different judge earlier in the day. 793 P.2d at 935-36. Defense counsel challenged the 
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juror for cause and the trial denied that challenge. Defense counsel subsequently used a 
peremptory challenge to have the juror dismissed. Suarez, 793 P.2d at 939. 
This Court reversed the trial court concluding that "on the record before us" the 
juror "should have been excused for cause" since a juror's "strong and deep 
impressions" concerning police veracity is a basis for a challenge for cause. Suarez. 
793 P.2d at 738-39 (citing State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984)). However, 
this Court noted in footnote 11 that there may have been many explanations for the 
juror's inconsistent answers but that "these possibilities are only speculative since the 
trial court failed to 'investigate further until the inference of bias was rebutted....'" 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, Christensen's failure to disclose the relationship between herself and 
Maul's key alibi witnesses-and her potential bias against them because of an alleged 
relationship between her husband and Angela Goode and an sour employment 
relationship between herself and Mary Goode-prevented any investigation by the trial 
court and counsel into such an inference of bias. More importantly, the failure to 
disclose even a casual relationship prevented Maul from exercising a peremptory 
challenge to dismiss her from the panel. Whereas at least in Brooks and Suarez—two 
cases later reversed by Utah appellate courts-defense counsel was able to exercise an 
informed peremptory challenge and dismiss the challenged jurors from the panel. See 
also, State v. Lacev. 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983). Accordingly the real prejudice 
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suffered in this case by Christensen's failure to disclose was not present in Brooks, 
Suarez or Lacey because the challenged jurors in those cases were dismissed from the 
panel and did not render judgment against the defendant. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Maul asks that this Court reverse his convictions on grounds that the trial court 
erred in failing to arrest judgment and grant him a new trial on grounds of juror bias. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _S_ day of August, 1999. 
RANDY S. KE!>TER 
Counsel for Appellant 
MARGARET P. LINDSA 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this _£Tday of August, 1999. 
s%-j*^&Ljr ^y - ^^y -
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413 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 23 
Rose v District Court 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486 
(1926) 
The time fixed by the statute was not juris 
dictionai and since it was regarded as merely 
directory, the further provision that a judgment 
should be rendered withm a reasonable time 
has been judicially read into the statute State 
v Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117 262 P2d 753 (1953) 
Kelbach v McCotter 872 P2d 1033 (Utah 
1994) 
Time limits are directory, not mandatory, and 
trial court's failure to comply with them does 
not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence, 
where sentence is imposed within a reasonable 
time so that the delay does not amount to an 
abuse of the court's powers or adversely affect 
the defendant, he is not entitled to go free but 
only to have a correct sentence imposed, with 
due consideration given for any time served 
because of the delay State v Helm, 563 P2d 
794 (Utah 1977) 
Defendant who was convicted in March, 
1976, placed on probation in October, 1976, and 
had probation revoked and sentence imposed in 
September, 1978, was sentenced within reason-
able time State v J ams , 597 P2d 873 (Utah 
1979) 
Continuance for defendant 
Where there is a reasonable extension of time 
for sentencing made at defendant's request or 
with his consent or where extension was calcu-
lated to be for defendant's possible benefit in 
determining whether he should be placed on 
probation, failure to impose sentence within 
statutory time was not ground for defendant's 
release State v Helm, 563 P2d 794 (Utah 
1977) 
Waiver 
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing 
judgment waived the right to object Rose v 
District Court 67 Ltah 526 248 P 486 (1926) 
S t a t e m e n t s before s e n t e n c i n g 
—Defendant 
Requirement that defendant be asked 
whether he has an\ caube why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him was 
substantially complied with b> question as to 
whether he or his counsel had anything to state 
prior to sentencing State \ McClendon, 611 
P2d 728 (Utah 1980) 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied uhen the sentencing hearing 
was held in his presence where he was ad 
dressed by the judge and elected to speak, an 
amended judgment subsequently entered by 
the trial court at which the defendant was not 
present nor represented by counsel, reflected 
only a correction of a clerical mistake in his 
sentence State v Lorrah, 761 P2d 1388 (Utah 
1988) 
Because by statute allocution is a right to 
introduce a mitigating statement and because 
capital defendants are entitled to present to the 
sentencing jury am mitigating information, 
courts must permit allocution at the sentencing 
phase, when requested, rather than 
postverdict State v Young, 853 P2d 327 (Utah 
1993) 
Validity of convic t ion 
Issues concerning the validity of a conviction 
are not cognizable under Subdivision (e) of this 
rule State v Brooks 908 P2d 856 (Utah 1995) 
Cited in State v Babbel, 813 P2d 86 (Utah 
1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am J u r 2d Criminal Law 
§ 526 et seq 
C.J.S. — 24 C J S Criminal Law § 1458 et 
seq 
A.L.R. — Consideration of accused's juvenile 
court record m sentencing for offense commit-
ted as adult, 64 A L R 3d 1291 
Loss of jurisdiction by delay m imposing 
sentence, 98 A L R 3d 605 
Propriety of sentencing justice's consider-
ation of defendant's failure or refusal to accept 
plea bargain, 100 A L R 3d 834 
Accused's right to sentencing by same judge 
who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to 
plea bargain, 3 A L R 4th 1181 
Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence 
contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently 
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87 
A L R 4th 384 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 414 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Challenge to jurisdiction. 
Grounds. 
Mental illness. 
Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Standard. 
Variance between charge and verdict. 
Cited. 
Chal lenge to jurisdict ion 
Jurisdictional question was properly raised 
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. 
Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926). 
Grounds 
A judgment may be arrested based on an 
insufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved 
in trial or as admitted by the parties. State v. 
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
afFd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where 
the verdict is based on inherently improbable 
evidence. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1993). 
Mental i l lness 
Where an alienist specifically found defen-
dant competent to proceed to sentencing, trial 
court did not err in refusing to arrest judgment 
despite the fact that defendant may have suf-
fered from an undetermined mental illness. 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988). 
Prosecutoria l misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct before trial was 
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judg-
ment, even though defendant's motion for ar-
rest of judgment or in the alternative for a new 
trial was made before imposition of sentence. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Standard 
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inher-
ently improbable as to an element of the crime 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. 
Petree, 659 R2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardell, 652 R2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Romero, 554 R2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. 
Workman, 852 R2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
V a r i a n c e be tween c h a r g e and verdict 
Although the verdict form signed by the jury 
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty of 
"forcible sexual assault" and the information 
had charged the defendant with "aggravated 
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the 
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the 
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury in-
tended; an error on the jury verdict form does 
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no 
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find 
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gen-
try, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 
1989); State v. Belgard, 830 P2d 264 (Utah 
1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§§ 520 to 524. 
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1453 et 
seq. 
AX.R. — Coram nobis on ground of other's 
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468. 
Rule 24, Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Absence of witness. Bias or prejudice of jurors. 
Affidavits of jurors. Discretion of court. 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-6381 
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JERAMIAH J. MAUL, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Criminal No. 981600003 
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff 
The defendant's Motion for a New Trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998. 
The defendant was personally present and was represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State 
was represented by Ross C Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having heard witnesses 
in this matter, and arguments thereon, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) Christine Christensen served as a juror in the above entitled case on August 27th and 28th, 
QAs%^-
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1998. Defendant found guilty by the jury of 3 felony offenses. 
2) Mary Goode and Angela Goode were witnesses for the defendant at trial. Angela Good 
was the defendant's main alibi witness. Angela Goode was living with the defendant in American 
Fork, Utah on the date the offense was committed. Mary Goode is the mother of Angela Goode. 
3) Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen testified for the State at the trial. Clay Nielsen and 
Angela Goode had a child together prior to the date of the offense but were not married. Clay 
Nielsen is the son of Craig Nielsen. 
4) When the Court was picking jurors in this case the above named four witnesses were 
named and identified by the parties as potential witnesses. Christine Christensen did not advise the 
Court about any acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses. 
5) The Court had instructed all potential jurors to inform the Court about any relationship 
or acquaintance they had with the witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance 
acquired by people living in small towns. 
6) For a two month period in 1993 Christine Christensen and Mary Goode worked as 
housekeepers (maids) in the same motel in Nephi, Utah. Christensen5s contact with Mary Goode was 
minimal, of a short duration, and of a nonpersonal nature dealing with their duties as housekeepers. 
7) Christine Christensen had no social involvement, contact, or relationship with Mary 
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Goode outside of work at the motel in 1993 and only knew her as a person who lived in the same 
town, Fountain Green, and who worked at the same motel for 2 months in 1993. Since 1993 she 
has had no contact with Mary Goode. 
8) For approximately 8 years Christine Christensen lived at 40 North State Street in Fountain 
Green, Utah. For part of that time Craig Nielsen lived across the State Highway from her. That all 
she knew about him at the time they lived across the highway from each other was that his name was 
Nielsen. She had no contact with him. 
9) After the trial in this matter Christine Christensen moved from 40 North State Street in 
Fountain Green to 477 South 200 West in Fountain Green, Utah. That the home at 40 North State 
Street in Fountain Green was a rental home. After the Christensen's left the home the owner of the 
home re-rented the home to Clay Nielsen. Christine Christensen had nothing to do with the rental 
of the home by the owner to Clay Nielsen. 
10) Christine Christensen had no personal contact with Clay Nielsen at all other than 
knowing who he was. 
11) Angela Goode lived in Fountain Green with her mother Mary Goode for approximately 
10-12 years. During that time Christine Christensen became aware of who she was. During that 
time they had been together at the same social function with several other people but were just casual 
acquaintances. 
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12) Christine Christensen also had contact with Angela Goode at Christine's place of 
employment, the 7-11 store in Nephi. That those contacts were incidental relating to Angela going 
into the store for business purposes. 
13) Allegations made by Angela Goode that a rumor existed in Fountain Green that Angela 
Goode was having an affair with Christine Christensen's husband were un-communicated to and 
unknown by Mrs. Christensen. The Court finds no credibility in these un-communicated innuendoes. 
14) The Court finds that in instances of conflict between the testimony of Christine 
Christensen and Angela Goode, the testimony of Christine Christensen to be more credible. 
15) Christine Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela 
Goode, Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen are all of a casual nature. Her contact with all of these people 
was minimal. 
16) Mary Goode and Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she 
was a potential juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having made the above and foregoing Findings of Fact now makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1) No actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine Christensen has been shown. 
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2) No basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against Mrs. Christensen. 
3) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be denied. 
*H*efj-1998. DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
€z 
AY L. McJfFF 
DISTRICTCOURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester 
at 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah 84663, postage prepaid this J3** day of November, 1998. 
Secretary 
\Q2tua* 
RANDY S. KESTER (#4357) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JEREMIAH MAUL, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
) Case No: 981600003 
) Judge Kay L. Mclff 
The Defendant, by and through counsel, Randy S. Kester of Young & Kester, under Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, moves the Court for an Order granting a new trial on the 
basis that error and impropriety was committed which had a substantial adverse affect upon the 
rights of the Defendant and in the interest of justice, a new trial should be granted. 
The basis for this motion is the realization and discovery following the trial that one of the 
jurors, to wit: Cliristine Cliristensen was not candid, honest and forthcoming in her answers to the 
voir dire questions. 
a-ni4{) 
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One of the voir dire questions to the jury was whether or not they knew or were acquainted 
with any of the witnesses to be called in the case. Two of Defendants witnesses were Angela Goode 
and Mary Goode. Angela Goode was the chief alibi witness for the Defendant and Mary Goode was 
not only the mother of Angela Goode but also testified to Angela's whereabouts, Jeremiah Maul's 
whereabouts and the phone conversation had with the State's chief witness Deputy Edwards, the 
evening prior to the commission of the crime and the early morning hours of the commission of the 
crime January 6 and 7, 1998. 
Following the Trial, it was brought to the attention through his counsel and through Mary 
Goode, that she realized this same Christine Cliristensen was a former employee of hers. Mary 
Goode is and has been a supervisor at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi, Utah. In the recent past, Christine 
Cliristensen served as a maid at that same Super 8 Motel and Mary Goode was her supervisor. The 
affidavit of Mary Goode indicates that Christine Christensen's leaving and the circumstances 
surrounding that termination were not pleasant and in fact, somewhat adverse. 
The Affidavits of Mary and Angela Good further establish that Christine Christensen: 
a) Knows and in fact has spread rumors and made false accusations about Angela 
Goode and Ms. Christensen's husband, Allen. 
b) Lives next door to Clay Nielson's brother, a brother who is often visited by 
Clay Nielson. 
c) Is married to Allen Christensen who is a long-time friend of Clay Nielson and 
his brother's and in fact attended school with Clay and his brothers. 
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d) Is well acquainted with Cal Nielsen, Clay's brother and that Cal Nielsen is 
a good friend and long-time acquaintance of Allen Christensen, Christine's husband. 
Had any of this information been revealed by juror Christensen at the time of the voir dire 
questioning, said juror would have been subject to challenge and based upon any of this information 
would have entitled the Defendant to inquire further as to the circumstances surrounding that 
termination, acquaintances and to the bias, adversity or prejudice created by those acquaintances 
termination of employment, adverse accusations and relationships. 
Attached please find the Affidavits of Mary Goode and Angela Goode in support of this 
motion. 
Based thereon, the Defendant moves the Court for a new trial to be heard by a jury of the 
Defendant's peers who are free from bias, prejudice or impartiality and to schedule this matter for 
immediate hearing. 
DATED this V<^  day of September, 1998. 
O S)\\^-^ 
RANDY S. KESTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / / day of September,, 1998^ I mailed a true and correct 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid. 
Ross C. Blackham, Esq. 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 N. Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
/ 
^ 
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RANDY S. KESTER (#4357) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JEREMIAH MAUL, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ANGELA GOODE 
) Case No. 981600003 
) Judge Kay L. Mclff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
Angela Goode, having been first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I was the chief alibi witness for the Defendant in the above captioned matter at Trial 
on August 27, 28, 1998. 
2. I became aware that one of the sitting jurors, more particular Christine Christensen 
was a former acquaintance of mine and have known her for approximately 5 years. 
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3. A couple of years ago, Allen, Christine Christensen's husband informed a friend of 
mine that Christine was making accusations of Allen and me having an improper relationship with 
one another. These allegations were untrue. 
4. Since Christine has known me for approximately five years and has actually made 
accusations against me, she should have made it known to the Court that she should not serve as a 
juror based upon our past association. 
DATED this //") day of September, 1998. 
UA^M \yJ7tk 
ANGEEA GOODE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Angela Goode, being first duly sworn upon this oath, deposes and says that she has read 
the foregoing and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge, 
information and belief. 
(- CffidfiLA. GOOT ^ft 'GEl  DE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforexne this _/0day of September, 1998. 
NOTARY PU8UC 
« • £ » I NOTARY PUBLltT 101 East 200 South 
SprtngvHle, Utah 84663 
My Commission Expires: 7-1949 
State of Utah 
S S S S S S S ! 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /f day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid. 
Ross C. Blackham, Esq. 
Sanpete County Courthouse / 
160 N. Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
RANDY S. KESTER (#4357) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JEREMIAH MAUL, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MARY GOODE 
) Case No. 981600003 
) Judge Kay L. Mclff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
Mary Goode, having been first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I was a witness for the Defendant Jeremiah Maul at the jury trial conducted before 
the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, which jury trial occurred on 
Thursday and Friday of August 27 and 28, 1998 before the Honorable K. L. Mclff. 
2. The core of my testimony was in support of the Defendant's major alibi witness, my 
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daughter Angela Goode. Her testimony was to the effect that Mr. Maul was with her the entire early 
morning hours from 1:15 a.m. until the time of their arrest at approximately 7:15 a.m. on the 
morning of January 7, 1998. 
3. My testimony was to the effect that my daughter by herself had been at my home 
from approximately 11:30 to approximately midnight on the late hours of January 6, 1998. My 
further testimony was that she was alone, that the Defendant Jeremiah Maul was not with her nor 
was she in the company of anyone else and that she left my home at approximately midnight. 
4. My further testimony was to the effect that I received a call in the early morning 
hours from Deputy Edwards and as part of that conversation and he made inquiry about whether I 
had seen Angela or Jeremiah and his testimony was that I replied, "they" were at my home earlier 
that evening at midnight. 
5. In my testimony at trial, I testified that in fact I may very well have replied in that 
fashion because of the way the question was asked and the fact that I was still waking. The fact of 
the matter was that only Angela came to my home. Mr. Maul never came to my home on the 
evening of January 6th nor was he at my home at any time on January 6 or 7, 1998. 
6. I am currently employed as a supervisor at Super 8 Motel in the City of Nephi, Juab 
County, State of Utah. I have been so employed in that position for approximately 6 years. 
7. In the recent past, in approximately 1996 or 1997, Christine Christensen was 
employed there as a maid. The same Christine Christensen served as juror in this case. 
8. Her work under my supervision was unsatisfactory while employed at the Super 8 
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and at some point, her employment was ended. 
9. This termination was not under pleasant circumstances and it is my sincere opinion 
that this same Christine Christensen had feelings of animosity toward me for those circumstances. 
They were adverse to the point that I am certain that she would have remembered me. 
10. It is my opinion that this animosity carried over into her service as a juror and may 
have tainted the impartiality of the jury with regard to my testimony and more particularly that of 
my daughter Angela Goode, the Defendant's chief alibi witness. 
11. As the Court is aware, pursuant to the court imposing the exclusionary rule, I was not 
present during the trial nor did I realize until the last jclosings of the trial that this same Christine 
Christensen was my former employee whom had left my employment with adverse feelings. 
12. I have no explanation why she would remain on the jury having those adverse 
feelings. I have no explanation why she would not reveal that under voir dire. I am advised that the 
jurors were asked if they were acquainted with any of the witnesses who would be testifying and I 
have no doubt that when I was testifying Ms. Christensen knew exactly who I was and would 
remember me. 
13. Being familiar with the circumstances surrounding her termination of employment, 
it is my strong opinion that she could not have had that experience and not have some adverse 
feelings toward me and even toward my daughter Angela. I believe that in the realm of common 
human experience, that was an event in her life that would have been highly emotional and unusual 
event to which she would have carried some kind of animosity of at least a minimal degree. 
3 
14. I can candidly tell the court that if someone fired me from a job, I would remember 
them and I would certainly have adverse feelings about it. It would make me uncomfortable serving 
as a juror in which I believe would effect my impartiality as a juror in a serious criminal case 
equivalent to this case before the Court. 
15. I am also aware that this same Ms. Christensen is next door neighbors to the brother 
of Clay Nielson; that Clay often visits this brother in Fountain Green and that Clay is acquainted 
with Ms. Christensen. My daughter Angela is in the middle of a custody dispute with Clay Nielson. 
16. Furthermore, Ms. Christensen's husband, Allen Christensen, attended school with 
Clay Nielson and his brothers and is a long time acquaintance of Clay. 
17. Moreover, Clay's brother Cal Nielson is a long time acquaintance and good friend 
of Allen Christensen, Mrs. Christensen's husband. 
18. I am also aware that this same Ms. Christensen knows my daughter Angela and has 
made false accusations about her perception of an alleged relationship between Ms. Christensen's 
husband and Angela. 
19. Despite these many connections, acquaintances and adverse relationships, I 
understand from Mr. Kester that Ms. Christensen revealed none of these. 
DATED this ) Q day of September, 1998. 
^ ^ v v .V ... ) ™ 9-
MARY-GOOfe 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Mary Goode, being first duly sworn upon this oath, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge, 
information and belief.
 k , A * ft ^4 
MARMJOOD^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforome this jQ day of September, 1998. 
NOTARY PUBUC 
DIANE DENUNGER 
101 East 200 South 
Spnngvilie. Utah 84663 
My Commission Expires. 7 1^99 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /^ day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid. 
Ross C. Blackham, Esq. 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 N. Main ( 
Manti, Utah 84642 V _ ^ 
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-6381 
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEREMIAH MAUL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN, being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states the 
following: 
1) That I was a member of the jury in the above captioned trial on August 27th and 28th, 
1998. 
2) That I have read the affidavits filed by Angela Goode and Mary Goode which have been 
filed in this case in support of a motion for a new trial. That the allegations made in those affidavits 
jUuioas 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN 
Criminal No. 981600003 
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff 
AFFIDAVIT of Christine Christensen - Page 2 
of bias and/or misconduct on my part are false and untrue. 
3) Specifically with regard to the allegations of Angela Goode it is true that I know who she 
is and have known for approximately 5 years but that our relationship is simply an acquaintance. I 
do not, and never have had any kind of personal, business, or social relationship with her and have 
never associated with her on any such basis. My acquaintance with her is much the same as the casual 
acquaintance I have with many people in the small town of Ft. Green where I live. 
4) The allegations made by Angela Goode that a ua couple of years ago Allen, Christine 
Christensen's husband, informed a friend of mine that Christine was making accusations of Allen 
and me having an improper relationship with one another", is absolutely false and untrue. I have 
never made any such allegations and know of no basis for such allegations. 
5) Specifically with regard to the allegations made by Mary Goode in her affidavit, it is true 
that in approximately 1993 or 1994, not 1996 or 1997 as alleged by Mary Goode, I was employed 
as a maid at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi, Utah. At the time Mary Goode was also employed there. 
Her allegations that she was my supervisor are untrue. My supervisor was Myda Carter. 
I left my employment at the Super 8 because of needing more time at home with an infant child. 
My leaving Super 8 was not a termination under unpleasant circumstances as alleged by 
Mary Goode and it is totally untrue and false that I had any feelings of animosity towards Mary 
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Goode. Our relationship was and always has been simply one of an acquaintance of another person 
who lives in the same small town and a person who I have no social or business relationships with 
except for a period of time where we worked at the same place. 
6) In the process of the trial when the judge asked if we knew any of the witnesses, he 
advised us that he was not interested in mere casual acquaintances but was interested in knowing 
about relationships that went beyond that. I did not respond to the Court that I knew Angela Goode 
and Mary Goode, as well as Deputy Gary Larsen who testified for the State because all these people 
are just acquaintances of mine in the causal manner of small towns. 
7) The other person that the affidavits of Angela and Mary Goode state that I am acquainted 
with, the brother of Clay Nielsen, Cal is also a mere acquaintance of mine and was not listed in any 
event as a witness in the case. 
8) That my acquaintance with these witnesses did not interfere with my ability to be a fair 
and impartial juror. I judged this case, and based my verdict solely and completely on the evidence 
presented at the trial. 
DATED this 4>Q day of October, 1998. 
CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this $0 day of October, 1998. 
My Commission Expires: 
:- ^I^LAL N o ^ Public 
t STFPHENSEN 1 
185 North Mai* ^ 
N*phi, Utah 84648 ^ 
My Commission Expiree • 
Janu ry 25, 2001 I 
State of Utah J 
Nqjiary Public 
Residing at: 
